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ABSTRACT
Encrypted databases have been studied for more than 10 years and
are quickly emerging as a critical technology for the cloud. The
current state of the art is to use property-preserving encrypting
techniques (e.g., deterministic encryption) to protect the confiden-
tiality of the data and support query processing at the same time.
Unfortunately, these techniques have many limitations. Recently,
trusted computing platforms (e.g., Intel SGX) have emerged as an
alternative to implement encrypted databases. This paper demon-
strates some vulnerabilities and the limitations of this technology,
but it also shows how to make best use of it in order to improve on
confidentiality, functionality, and performance.
1. INTRODUCTION
After more than 10 years of research [18], encrypted databases
are becoming a reality. There are a number of promising start-
ups in this space (e.g., Privic, Cryptonor, and ZeroDB) and, among
established vendors, Microsoft recently shipped the Always En-
crypted feature for both the on-premise and cloud versions of SQL
Server [28]. CryptDB [25] is a famous research system that has
become iconic for the current popularity of encrypted database sys-
tems.
The goal of an encrypted database is to maintain confidential-
ity of the data. That is, the data should only be readable by the
owner of the data and other entities who have been authorized by
the owner of the data. The data should not be accessable to hack-
ers who have gained control of the machine that hosts the database.
In a cloud scenario, the data should not be accessable to the cloud
provider, its administrators or to co-tenants who run other applica-
tions on the same machines. All these guarantees should be main-
tained under the strongest possible assumptions, including security
vulnerabilities of the operating system and other libraries on the
machine. At the same time, the goal is to run as much database
functionality as possible (ideally, the full SQL standard and other
modern features) and at the same cost and performance as a regular,
non-encrypted database system.
To achieve these goals, all encrypted database systems have adopted
an architecture that is called client-side encryption, depicted in Fig-
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Figure 1: Client-side Encryption
ure 1 [1, 18, 25, 26]. Data are encrypted on client machines, which
are assumed to be secure and have access to all encryption keys.
The encrypted data are sent from clients to the database server that
stores the data persistently. Queries are issued by applications at
the client and are rewritten by a DB driver to encrypt query con-
stants. The rewritten, encrypted queries are then sent to the server
and executed. The server returns encrypted query results, which
are in turn decrypted by the DB driver at the client.
To effect queries on encrypted data on the (untrusted) database
server, the current generation of encrypted database systems lever-
age property-preserving encryption (PPE); this approach is often
also referred to as partially homomorphic encryption. The key idea
of PPE is that, depending on the encryption algorithm used, the
database system can carry out operations upon the encrypted data
without decrypting it. A prominent example is deterministic en-
cryption (e.g., AES in ECB mode), which produces the same ci-
phertext when presented with the same plaintext; i.e., x = y ⇔
enc(x) = enc(y) for two plaintext values, x and y, and a determin-
istic encryption function, enc(). As a result, the database system
can evaluate equality predicates (point queries), equi-joins (e.g.,
foreign-key / primary key joins), and group-by operations. Another
example is order-preserving encryption (OPE); e.g., [1, 9, 24, 26].
OPE has the following property: x ≤ y ⇔ enc(x) ≤ enc(y). With
OPE, the database system can execute range predicates, Top N, and
order-by operations directly on encrypted data. Finally, Paillier en-
cryption [23] is a way to support arithmetics on encrypted data. Mi-
crosoft Always Encrypted is based on deterministic encryption [28]
and CryptDB supports a variety of different PPE techniques [25].
Unfortunately, the state-of-the-art in property-preserving and ho-
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Figure 2: Client-side Encryption with Server-Side Trusted Machine
momorphic encryption has many limitations. PPE such as deter-
ministic encryption, OPE, or Paillier is good to support a specific
functionality; however, it does not compose. That is, there is no
PPE scheme that supports both arithmetics (as with Paillier) and
comparisons (as with deterministic): It is either one or the other so
that it is not possible to process predicates of the form A+B = C,
if A, B, and C are encrypted. Furthermore, there is a great deal of
SQL functionality (e.g., LIKE predicates with pattern matching) for
which no good PPE technique is known. Finally, PPE techniques
often do not preserve SQL semantics for errors; for instance, Pail-
lier does not handle overflow errors correctly. Another problem of
many PPE techniques is that they leak information, thereby com-
promising confidentiality for functionality [22]. Full homomorphic
encryption [13] overcomes these problems: It is general, can imple-
ment any circuit, and it is semantically secure. However, to date,
full homomorphic encryption is impractical from a performance
perspective.
Recent advances in trusted computing platforms have given rise
to an alternative way to implement encrypted databases. These
trusted computing platforms promise to provide strong security fea-
tures and support arbitrary computation. IBM’s secure co-processor
[20], Intel SGX [10], and FPGAs [11] are all based upon secure
hardware which provides secure storage and compute capabilities.
Similarly, special hypervisor extensions such as VSM [21] are de-
signed to provide stronger isolation and code integrity guarantees.
Figure 2 shows the extended encrypted database architecture that
makes use of this technology. Here, the server is enhanced with a
trusted computing platform that acts as a secure co-processor and
runs a special process that we call the trusted machine (TM). Clients
grant the TMs access to their encryption keys (through secure pro-
tocols), and the TMs can then compute any operation on the en-
crypted data by decrypting the data, carrying out the operation, and
then encrypting the result. Projects that have explored this architec-
ture are TrustedDB [7], Cipherbase [3,4], Haven [8], and VC3 [27].
Such trusted computing platforms do not have the limitations of
PPE or full homomorphic encryption: They are Turing-complete
and have acceptable performance. For instance, such TMs can
compose functionality to support comparisons and arithmetics on
the same encrypted data. Furthermore, they are reasonably secure:
There are known side-channel attacks for Intel SGX [10], but the
technology is only going to get better. Despite all these features, it
is nevertheless challenging to build an encrypted database system
using trusting computing platforms. As we will show in this paper,
if not done correctly, all the security advantages of trusted comput-
ing platforms are gone and attackers can easily get access to confi-
dential and encrypted data. Furthermore, there are still some basic
database features such as integrity constraints and certain kinds of
updates that cannot be implemented without leaking information
even when using such trusted computing platforms and assuming
that they are secure.
This paper makes three contributions. First, it generalizes and
formalizes the definition of an encrypted database system whose
implementation is based on a trusted computing platform (Sec-
tion 2). Based on this formalization, our second contribution is
to demonstrate novel attacks on encrypted database systems with
trusted computing platforms that have not been studied before (Sec-
tion 3). Given these attacks, it becomes clear that it is not possible
to build a perfect encrypted database system that leaks no informa-
tion on confidential data, implements the full SQL standard, and
has good performance for any SQL query, even assuming that the
trusted computing platform is fully secure and not subject to side-
channel attacks, bugs, or other vulnerabilities. Based on this ob-
servation, our third and arguably most important contribution is a
clean characterization of different levels of confidentiality. Specif-
ically, we study a scheme to implement an encrypted database that
leaks no information, is able to process all read-only queries, but
has both functional and performance limitations. Furthermore, we
study relaxed schemes that have good performance and implement
(almost) the full SQL standard, but are subject to potential infer-
ence attacks. While non of these schemes are perfect, they domi-
nate state-of-the-art encrypted systems that are based on PPE (e.g.,
CryptDB and Always Encrypted) in all regards: functionality, per-
formance, and confidentiality.
2. ENCRYPTED DATABASES
This section gives a formal definition of an encrypted database.
This definition generalizes the definitions used in related projects
such as CryptDB [25] and Microsoft Always Encrypted [28]. This
definition helps us to reason about attacks on encrypted databases
and different levels of confidentiality (Sections 3 to 6).
Encrypted databases allow users to specify which data is confi-
dential and needs to be encrypted and which kinds of operations
are supported on which data. For instance, credit card numbers
are typically declared to be confidential; equality is often needed to
validate a credit card number, but range predicates and arithmetics
are rarely needed on credit card numbers. As another example,
salaries are also confidential in many applications, but often re-
quire a broader set of operations, including arithmetics; e.g., raise
a salary by 10 percent.
In systems that are based on PPE (like CryptDB and Always En-
crypted), the encryption method implicitly determines the set of
operations. In systems that make use of trusted computing plat-
forms, the set of operations on an encrypted column needs to be
specified explicitly. As will become clear in Sections 3 and later,
it is exactly this specification of the functionality that determines
the confidentiality, performance, and functionality of an encrypted
database. It will also become clear that there are many ways to ef-
fect different functionality and that unfortunately, it is easy to get
wrong.
2.1 Confidential Data Types
Like any other relational database, an encrypted database is a
collection of tables. Each table has a schema that specifies the name
of the table and the types of all the columns of the table. What
makes an encrypted database special is that the type of a column
can be a confidential type (or encrypted type), indicating that the
values of this column need to be encrypted.
In general, a type of an encrypted SQL database is defined by its
domain, its encryption method, and a key to encrypt values of that
type. More formally, a type is a triple, {D, E ,K}.
Domain. Just as in any other programming environment, the do-
main of a type defines all the values that an instance of that type
may have. In SQL, the domain of a type may include null values.
Furthermore, we encode errors as special values of the domain to
better compose functions in the event of errors (Section 5). For in-
stance, the Integer domain includes error values that represent the
result of “1 / 0” (division-by-zero error) and overflows.
A domain is length indistinguishable if any two values in the do-
main have the same representational length. A domain is length
bounded if there exists an upper bound M for the representational
length of any value in the domain. For example, char(n) is
length indistinguishable, while varchar(n) is length bounded.
A length bounded domain can be made length indistinguishable by
padding. Length indistinguishability is important for formal confi-
dentiality statements because standard encryption schemes such as
AES on strings reveal the length and unintended information might
be inferred from this length in many applications.
Encryption Technique. In theory and for all of the discussions
in this paper, two encryption algorithms are sufficient: (a) “proba-
bilistic” (e.g., AES in CBC mode) encryption that is IND-CPA se-
cure (indistinguishability against chosen plaintext) and (b) “plain-
text” (i.e., not encrypted at all for non-confidential data). Any other
encryption algorithm can be simulated in our type system with the
help of rules (Section 2.2). In practice and for performance reasons,
however, we will also consider PPE algorithms such as determinis-
tic encryption (Section 5.2).
Encryption Key. The third component that defines a type is the
encryption key. In practice, 256-bit AES keys are common. For
plaintext, no key is needed; i.e., T.K = ∅ if T.E = plaintext.
2.1.1 Naming Conventions
In the remainder of this paper, we use the following naming con-
ventions for types. First, we use Table.column or just column (if
the table is clear) to denote the type of a specific column. For in-
stance, Employee.name denotes the type of the name column of the
Employee table.
Second, we often use “one-time-keys” to encrypt query constants
or intermediate query results. One-time-keys are encryption keys
that can be used only for a limited duration of time (e.g., in the
context of processing a single query) and may not be used to en-
crypt any data that is persistently stored in the database. We denote
types that are based on one-time-keys using the Temp keyword. For
instance, Temp(Employee.name) denotes a type that has the same
domain as Employee.name, uses a one-time-key which is different
from the key of Employee.name, and may also differ in terms of the
encryption technique from Employee.name. Temp(Integer) denotes
a type that has the domain Integer, uses a one-time-key which is
different from any other key used in the system, and has a custom-
defined encryption technique. If the original type is unambigious,
we just use Temp to denote a derived type with a one-time key.
Finally, we use the traditional names to denote plaintext types.
For instance, Integer denotes the traditional, unencrypted Integer
type, including the not-a-number (NAN) and null values for inte-
gers. Likewise, Boolean denotes the traditional, unencrypted Boolean
type of SQL with its three-value logic.
2.2 Rules
We uses rules over types to control which operations are permit-
ted over which types in an encrypted database. A rule is of the
form:
f(Ti1, . . . , Tin)→ 〈To1, . . . , Tom〉
Here, f is an n-ary function with domain Ti1.D × · · · × Tin.D
and range To1.D×· · ·×Tom.D. Such a rule specifies that the TM
can execute f over the inputs encrypted as specified by the input
types and produces its outputs encrypted as specified by the output
types. For example, we could provide rules for basic functions such
as “add”, “divide”, or “equal”. A rule, however, can also specify
more complex functions, predicates, and even user-defined func-
tions. For instance, to evaluate predicates of the form A+ B = C
on three encrypted integers, we could define the following rule: ad-
dEqual(EncryptedInteger, EncryptedInteger, EncryptedInteger) →
EncryptedBoolean.
For encrypted database that are based on PPE, the rules are de-
fined implicitly; i.e., equal(T, T)→ Boolean, if T is deterministi-
cally encrypted. In our more general setting that makes use of TMs,
it is important to define and reason about all rules explicitly.
2.3 Schemas with Type Metadata
To integrate our type system into a relational database system,
we propose to extend the SQL DDL in the following ways:
• Declare and specify all the types used in the database.
• Specify all the rules. Rules may only refer to declared types
or temp types with one-time-keys derived from declared types.
• Associate each column of a table with a declared type.
We refer to the types declared in such a schema as schema types.
In contrast to ordinary types which are defined in Section 2.1, schema
types are associated to a rule set. In the context of a database and
a rule set, it is possible to reason about the information leakage
and strength of a type. For instance, we can have two types: one
for credit card numbers and one for salaries. Both types could use
AES encryption. However, we likely want to have stronger security
guarantees for credit card numbers and we accomplish this by pro-
viding a richer set of rules that apply to salaries (e.g., a “percent-
raise” function) than for credit card numbers. Thus, the context
(rule set and database) determines the strength of a type and Sec-
tion 4 formalizes this property. Since the focus of this paper is on
encrypted database systems, we will mostly use the term type in the
remainder of this paper, even though strictly speaking we should
be using the term schema type to refer to a type in the context of a
database with a rule set.
Conceptually, the owner of a database can freely specify a rule
set to their liking. We propose, however, that a database system
offers predefined rule sets for different levels of confidentiality be-
cause it is easy to get wrong (and thus, insecure). Section 5 dis-
cusses examples of such rule sets that correspond to levels of con-
fidentiality that are used in practice today.
Several columns of the same or different tables can be associ-
ated to the same type. That is, there is an N:1 relationship between
columns and types. For instance, often the primary key column
and all foreign key columns that refer to that primary key have the
same type. For brevity and without loss of generality, this paper
only discusses scenarios in which all values of a column are en-
crypted using the same key; i.e., a column is associated to only one
and not multiple types. Although support for multiple encryption
keys and types within a column is useful for multi-tenant database
systems [6], throughout this work we assume that such multi-tenant
databases are horizontally partitioned by tenant.
2.4 Implementation
There have been several projects that have implemented an en-
crypted database system using a trusted computing platform. For
this work, we adopted the approaches taken in the Cipherbase [4]
and VC3 projects [27]. In these approaches, the computation is
split between a trusted machine (TM) and an untrusted machine
(UM) as shown in Figure 2. The UM carries out all I/O and commu-
nication with clients as no state-of-the-art trusted computing tech-
nology is able to do I/O. Furthermore, the UM carries out all com-
putations on unencrypted (public) data or computations on data en-
crypted using PPE, if the operation matches the PPE scheme (e.g.,
comparison and deterministic encryption). The TM is only needed
to carry out operations on encrypted data and if that operation re-
quires decrypting the data.
Query processing proceeds as follows: The client rewrites a query
and encrypts all constants, as described in the introduction. The
UM at the server compiles and optimizes the rewritten query. Dur-
ing compilation, the server has access to all the meta-data (types
and rules), detects all operations that must be carried out by the TM,
and generates a corresponding query plan. The UM, in turn, exe-
cutes the query by interpreting the query plan and calling the TM
as needed and returns the (encrypted) query results to the client.
Most of this query processing process is straight-forward and the
same as in a traditional (non-encrypted) database system [4]. There
are two critical steps in this process, however: First, before the TM
can execute any operations on encrypted data, it must receive the
keys from the client. We call this process program registration and
describe it below. Second, query optimization heavily depends on
the rules specified by the developer or security officer. For instance,
hash joins can only be used if there is a rule that allows the TM to
compute a hash function on the encrypted data. Section 5 discusses
how different rule designs impact query optimization.
To give an example, consider the following query:
SELECT * FROM Employee
WHERE department = “IT” and salary > 500;
Assume that department is not confidential (plaintext) and salary
is confidential and encrypted using AES in CBC mode with key,
Ksalary . Furthermore, assume that there is a rule:
greater(Employee.salary, Temp)→ Boolean
Then the client would rewrite the query, thereby encrypting the
Constant 500 using a one-time key. Furthermore, the client would
pass this one-time key and Ksalary to the TM using the program
registration protocol described below. The compiler of the UM has
full access to all meta-data (types and rules) and, thus, knows that
department is plaintext, that salary is encrypted, and that
there is a rule that authorizes the TM to execute the predicate on
salary. Correspondingly, the UM compiles a plan that uses the
Employee.department index (if that exists) to select all IT workers
and then calls the TM to post-filter the employees that, in addition,
match the salary predicate.
There are many other ways to implement encrypted databases us-
ing TMs. One approach would be to implement the compiler in the
TM because query compilation can leak information, too. Studying
the affects of that approach is beyond the scope of this paper which
focuses on information leakage of the TM at the running time of
a query. Another approach is to execute all operations by the TM,
rather than splitting the work between the UM and the TM. In this
approach, the UM is merely used to do I/O, thereby fetching data
from disk for the TM, and serving as a proxy to accept queries from
clients and passing query results to the clients. This approach has
been proposed by the TrustedDB [7] and Haven projects [8]. Again,
studying the confidentiality/performance tradeoffs of that approach
is beyond the scope of this paper. Our approach are not directly ap-
plicable to that architecture because these systems can better con-
strain the capabilities of an attacker and, thus, have a weaker at-
tacker model (Section 3). However, there are reasons why these
systems are not mainstream yet and why most start-ups and big
players like Microsoft use the CryptDB-model of encrypted data-
bases which is also the basis for this work. One particular problem
of systems like TrustedDB and Haven is that they require porting
an entire database engine to the TM which makes the TM vulner-
able from bugs in the DBMS engine code. Another problem is
that in the TrustedDB and Haven architecture, it becomes difficult
to administer the encrypted database and for the cloud provider to
support and debug customer incidents. Eventually, we believe that
both models should be studied and formalized and the main contri-
bution of this paper is to formalize a generalized “CryptDB-style”
model that makes use of server-side trusted computing.
Program Registration. The rules determine which operations
(on which keys and types) the TM is allowed to perform. Cor-
respondingly, each authorized client that has access to encryption
keys has an authentic copy of the rule set and explicitly authorizes
the TM to execute operations using those keys. We call this autho-
rization process program registration.
In a nutshell, program registration works as follows. For each
rule, the client sends a message to the TM that contains the name
of the operation and the encryption keys of all input and output
types. This method is encrypted using the TM’s public key so that
only the TM can decrypt this message and can retrieve the keys. To
this end, all TMs must be part of a public-key infrastructure which
attests that the TMs and their public keys can be trusted.
Clients carry out program registration lazily. If a function of a
type is never needed by the application, then that function is never
registered at the TM and, thus, that function is never exposed to a
potential attacker who has access to the TM. This lazy approach to
program registration corresponds to the onion technique proposed
as part of the CryptDB project [25]. Like lazy program registra-
tion, CryptDB degrades the level of encryption (using a weaker
PPE technique) lazily and as needed by the application by peeling
off a layer of stronger encryption from the onion. The important
difference is that this process is expensive in CryptDB because it
involves updating (re-encrypting) every tuple. In contrast, this pro-
cess is cheap with lazy program registration because it involves
only sending a single message from a client to the TM. Likewise,
deregistering a function in the TM is cheap as it involves only a
single message to the TM. In contrast, adding a layer of encryption
to CryptDB to improve confidentiality is expensive because it again
involves updating the whole table, thereby shipping the whole ta-
ble from the server to the client, re-encrypting it at the client, and
sending the re-encrypted table back from the client to the server.
Query Optimization. The basic principles of query optimiza-
tion for an encrypted database system are the same as for a tradi-
tional database system [16]: enumerate alternative plans, estimate
the cost of each plan, and select the cheapest plan. Furthermore,
the algorithms and operators used in an encrypted database system
are the same as in traditional database systems. The only difference
is that some of the computation (e.g., hashing a value, comparisons
between two values) is carried out by the TM, whereas the bulk of
the algorithms and data movement are carried out by the UM.
Query compilation is nevertheless more complex for two rea-
sons. First, the TM can be seen as additional processing resources.
Therefore, encrypted database systems with TMs require distributed
query optimization in order to minimize the number of interactions
between the UM and TM. An alternative way is to consider expres-
sions that are evaluated by the TM as expensive UDFs and optimize
queries accordingly [19]. Second, encryption may limit the use of
certain algorithms; for instance, hash-based algorithms are not ap-
plicable to Probabilistic types that represent the strongest level of
confidentiality (Section 5). Third, depending on the rule system,
there might be no, one, or several ways to evaluate an expression
and query using the TM. Similar issues have been studied in the
context of heterogeneous database system with Web sources in the
late Nineties [17]. To illustrate, consider the following example
query and example rules ExR1-ExR7:
SELECT R.a + R.b + R.c FROM R
ExR1: add(R.a,R.b)→ R.b
ExR2: add(R.a,R.b)→ R.c
ExR3: add(R.b,R.c)→ R.c
ExR4: add(Temp(Integer), Temp(Integer))→ Temp(Integer)
ExR5: rotateKey(R.a)→ Temp(Integer)
ExR6: rotateKey(R.b)→ Temp(Integer)
ExR7: rotateKey(R.c)→ Temp(Integer)
There are two ways to execute this query. First, with Rules ExR1
and ExR3. Second, with Rules ExR5, ExR6, ExR7, and ExR4.
The first way involves two calls to the TM per record whereas the
second way involves four calls so that the first approach is cheaper.
3. ATTACKER MODEL AND EXAMPLE AT-
TACKS
Why is it so difficult to build encrypted databases? Why don’t
trusted computing platforms solve all problems? The difficulty lies
in defining the right rule set and, thus, the right set of operations to
run in the TM. If the wrong set of operations runs in the TM, the
system leaks information and therefore becomes insecure.
This section defines our attacker model and presents several ex-
ample attacks that demonstrate why the rule set of an encrypted
database must be carefully chosen. Based on these observations,
the next sections then give guidance on how to design rule sets for
encrypted databases.
3.1 Attacker Model
Looking back at Figure 2, we assume that the client and the TM
are trusted and secure and that the attacker can fully observe and
manipulate the UM, all other components of the system, and all
communication. Specifically, we assume that the attacker has the
following capabilities (Figure 3):
1. Database: The attacker can read and modify the encrypted
database as stored on disk or in the main memory/caches of
the UM.
2. Queries: The attacker can observe all communication be-
tween the UM and TM and between the UM and all clients.
In particular, the attacker can see queries submitted by clients
and the (encrypted) query results returned to the clients.
3. UM: The attacker can read and modify the memory of the
UM and change the code that runs in the UM.
4. TM: The attacker can call the TM as often as she wants, with
any input. Furthermore, we assume that the attacker knows
which programs are registered in the TM. However, the at-
tacker cannot read or modify the state of the TM in any way.
Read State Modify State Observe Messages Send Messages
Client 7 7 X X
UM X X X X
TM 7 7 X X
Figure 3: Capabilities of Attacker
These capabilities model a strong, active attacker. Such a strong
attacker model helps to protect the database against many possible
attacks such as insider attacks (administrators or cloud providers),
third-party attackers (hackers who gain control of the UM, co-tenants),
and bugs in the software of the UM which is the bulk of the data-
base system. In practice, the capabilities of attackers on the UM
may be more limited, but assuming such a strong attacker makes it
easier to reason about the confidentiality of the system: The only
thing that matters are the capabilities of the TM (i.e., the functions
supported by the TM) and the encryption technique used to protect
confidential data.
In one regard, this attacker model might be too optimistic. It
is known that Intel SGX is subject to side-channel attacks [10].
However, studying these kinds of attacks is beyond the scope of
this paper and we hope that trusted computing technology will get
better, making such attacks more difficult.
Under this attacker model, it is easy for the attacker to launch
denial-of-service attacks. For instance, the attacker could simply
delete the database on disk or overload the TM with garbage re-
quests. The attacker could also drop all traffic between clients and
the database server. Such denial-of-service attacks are outside of
the scope of this paper. The goal of this paper is to study confiden-
tiality and protecting secrets stored in the encrypted database.
3.2 Trivial Attacks
Let us start with a trivial example to demonstrate why the rule set
of an encrypted database must be designed carefully. The following
rule authorizes the TM to compare an (encrypted) salary with a
plaintext value:
equal(salary, Integer)→ Boolean
With this rule, an attacker can discover all salaries in the database
by calling the TM to compare them to all possible Integer values.
Likewise, the following rule which authorizes the TM to simply
decrypt an encrypted value must not be registered in the TM:
decrypt(salary)→ Integer
3.3 Information Leakage from Errors
Another source of information leakage in an encrypted database
with a TM are errors. Consider the following rule which authorizes
the TM to execute divisions on salaries (e.g., to implement a 10
percent salary raise), return the result in an encrypted form, yet to
expose errors in plaintext so that the UM can react and not update
a salary in the event of an error.
division(salary, salary)→ salary, Error
If the TM supports this operation, then an attacker can easily find all
employees in the database who work for free by obverving division
by zero errors when trying to divide a salary by itself.
Exploiting overflow errors is another way for an attacker to infer
information from an encrypted database. By observing overflow
errors, it is possible to determine which of two (encrypted) integers
is larger than the other one by iteratively muliplying these integers
with themselves until an overflow error occurs.
3.4 Composition
Arguably, the most dangerous attacks come from composing func-
tionality in the TM. In this attack, each rule by itself is safe, but the
combination of rules allows the attacker to infer confidential val-
ues. As a simple example, assume that we would like to support
both arithmetics and comparisons on salaries and define the fol-
lowing rules:
division(salary, salary)→ salary
add(salary, salary)→ salary
equal(salary, salary)→ Boolean
To determine the value of a specific encrypted salary (e.g., Bob.salary),
we execute the following steps, assuming that Bob’s salary is not
0:
1. EncryptedOne = TM.divide(Bob.salary, Bob.salary)
2. iEncrypt = EncryptedOne; iPlaintext = 1;
3. while (NOT TM.equal(Bob.salary, iEncrypt))
(a) iPlaintext++;
(b) iEncrypt = TM.add(iEncrypt, EncryptedOne);
4. return iPlaintext
3.5 Other, Known Inference Attacks
All of these example attacks are specific to an encrypted data-
base enhanced with a trusted computing platform. In addition, all
attacks that have been studied for more traditional encrypted data-
bases (e.g., CryptDB) remain valid.
[22] shows how to reveal confidential information from a med-
ical database if the data is deterministically encrypted and the at-
tacker exploits publicly available background knowledge about value
distributions. This work is directly applicable to an encrypted data-
base with a TM, even if the data is not deterministically encrypted.
The only thing that is needed is that the TM supports equality
(equal(T, T ) → Boolean rule) and the same inference attacks on
T are possible as if T were deterministically encrypted.
As another example, disk access patterns can reveal confiden-
tial information [12] in any kind of encrypted database system.
For instance, if it is known that Bob gets salary raises most fre-
quently, then an attacker can exploit this information to discover
Bob’s record in the encrypted database by observing which record
is most frequently updated.
4. REASONING ABOUT CONFIDENTIAL-
ITY
The previous section gave several examples that demonstrate that
it is important to define the rule set of an encrypted database care-
fully. If not, an attacker can easily infer secrets from the database.
This section gives a framework to reason about the confidentiality
of types in an encrypted database. The key idea is to model the
types of the encyrpted database as a graph and determine potential
information leakage by analyzing this graph.
4.1 What is Dangerous?
All the example attacks of the previous section have one thing
in common: The TM returns plaintext values. These plaintext val-
ues are either Boolean values (Section 3.2) and inference attacks on
determinic encryption [22]), errors (Section 3.3), or pointers (infer-
ence from access patterns [12]). In other words, when analyzing
the rule set of an encrypted database, we need to look for rules
Salary Bool
+ , /
==
Figure 4: Example Information Flow Graph (Section 3.4)
that involve plaintext types as results. As shown in Section 3.2,
the combination of plaintext parameters and plaintext results can
be particularly dangerous.
Another observation is that danger can propagate through rules.
For instance, if I add two encrypted integers and then compare the
result with another integer, then that comparison might leak infor-
mation about the first two encrypted integers.
A third observation is that rules with cycles can also be partic-
ularly dangerous such as the add rule in Section 3.4 which allows
the attacker to use the TM to enumerate the whole domain.
4.2 Information Flow Graph
Based on these observations, we study the information leakage
using an information flow graph. The nodes of this graph are types
and edges in this graph are determined by rules. More formally,
given a schema with types T and rule set R, we define the infor-
mation flow graph G(T ,R) as follows:
1. Vertices are the schema types in T .
2. There is an edge T1 → T2 with label f(i, j) if there is a rule
involving function f where T1 is the ith input type of f and
T2 is the jth output type of f .
The set of plaintext terminating walks of Type T ,PTWalk(T,R),
is the (possibly infinite) set of walks (paths) in the information flow
graph (G(T ,R)) that start at vertex T and end in a vertex corre-
sponding to a plaintext type.
With these definitions, we can now revisit the examples from the
previous section. For instance, Figure 4 shows the information flow
graph for the rule set of Section 3.4. Due to the cycle, there is an
infinite number of plaintext terminating walks for Emp.salary.
4.3 What Works?
A type has no information leakage if its values are encrypted us-
ing an IND-CPA encryption technique (e.g., AES in CBC mode)
and there are no paths from this type (or any parameters of rules
it is involved in) to a plaintext type in the information flow graph.
Section 5.1 gives an example class of such types and discusses its
properties. In a nutshell, all rules follow the encrypted in / en-
crypted out principles for these types so that the TM only takes
encrypted inputs and produces encrypted outputs.
Unfortunately, as shown in Sections 5 and 6, it is not always
possible to follow the encrypted in / encrypted out principle for
all types because it limits certain SQL functionality (e.g., the use
of integrity constraints, Section 6) and the use of important data-
base features such as indexes (Section 5). All these features require
some paths to plaintext values. While we cannot prove absolute
confidentiality in such situations (any path to a plaintext type leaks
information and is a potential vulnerability), we can try to minimize
the paths to plaintext values and, thus, limit information leakage as
much as possible.
To give an example, Figure 5 shows the information flow graph
of the following rule set that supports arithmetics and comparisons
Salary Bool
+ , /
==
Temp
==
Figure 5: Breaking the Cycle
on salaries (in particular, predicates of the form A + B = C) and
is not vulnerable to the enumeration attack of Section 3.4:
division(salary, salary)→ Temp
add(salary, salary)→ Temp
equal(salary, temp)→ Boolean
The key idea of this rule set is that it breaks the cycle by using temp
types; i.e., by encrypting the result of any arithmetics with salaries
using one-time-keys. As shown in Section 5.2, this trick allows to
support almost any SQL feature without leaking more information
than today’s generation of encrypted databases (e.g., CryptDB).
4.4 Type Hierarchy
Using the concepts of an information flow graph and plaintext
terminating walks, it is also possible to define a partial order on
types. A stronger type leaks as much or less information than a
weaker type. Type TR1 is stronger than TR2 iffPTWalk(T,R1) ⊆
PTWalk(T,R2). Here TR1 corresponds to schema type T with
rule set R1 and TR2 to schema type T with rule set R2. Intuitively,
more paths to a plaintext type mean that R2 is richer than R1 and,
in particular, R2 supports more potentially dangerous functionality
that can result in infering values from T using plaintext values that
result on computations on values of T .
The existence of type hierarchies makes it possible to define lev-
els of confidentiality. The next sections will discuss three possible
levels.
5. CONFIDENTIALITY VS. PERFORMANCE
TRADEOFFS
This section defines three classes of schema types: (a) Proba-
bilistic, (b) Deterministic, and (c) Ordered. We chose these classes
because they correspond to the “confidentiality à la carte” offer-
ings of state-of-the-art encrypted database systems that are based
on property-preserving encryption (PPE). For instance, Microsoft
Always Encrypted supports probabilistic and deterministic encryp-
tion with AES [28]. CryptDB supports probabilistic and determin-
istic encryption with AES and order-preserving encryption with a
custom-defined encryption scheme [24].
Probabilistic data types as defined here give the same confiden-
tiality guarantees as probabilistic encryption in CryptDB and Al-
ways Encrypted. Likewise, Deterministic and Ordered types as
defined here provide the same level of confidentiality (informa-
tion leakage) as deterministic and order-preserving encryption in
CryptDB. The difference is that, with trusted computing resources,
we can support significantly more functionality than Always En-
crypted and CryptDB at the same level of confidentiality. In fact,
we show that we can process any SQL SELECT statement at any
level of confidentiality, even for Probabilistic types. Using a TM
and our generalized model of an encrypted database, the three lev-
els of confidentiality differ most significantly in performance: The
PR1: f(T1, . . . , T, . . . Tn)→ TR
PR2: Pred(T1, . . . , T, . . . Tn)→ EncBool
PR3: identity(T )→ TR
PR4: orderPair(R1, R2, compare)→ RR, RR
Figure 6: Illustration of rules consistent with Probabilistic types
T, TR are Probabilistic and others are arbitrary types in R1-R3
R1, R2 any Row Type; RR any Probabilistic Row Type
higher the level of confidentiality, the lower the performance for
certain queries. For instance, Probabilistic types can only make
use of oblivious algorithms and no indexes whereas indexes can be
used for both Deterministic and Ordered types.
5.1 Probabilistic
5.1.1 Definition and Confidentiality
Probabilistic is the strongest level of confidentiality. Given a
schema with types T and rulesR, a type P ∈ T is Probabilistic if
there is no path in the information flow graph G(T ,R) from P to
a plaintext type. That is, probabilistic types can only be involved
in rules in which all other types (inputs and outputs) are also prob-
abilistic. Furthermore, an IND-CPA encryption algorithm must be
used for probabilistic types; e.g., AES in CBC mode.
Both Microsoft Always Encrypted and CryptDB support this level
of confidentiality, but they do not support any operations on proba-
bilistically encrypted data. That is, to process values of these types,
the client must download all the data (no filter possible), decrypt the
data at the client, and process any kind of query on these values at
the client. We can show that with a server-side TM, we can execute
any SQL SELECT statement on Probabilistic types support and
provide the same confidentiality guarantees as Always Encrypted
and CryptDB for probabilistically encrypted data.
5.1.2 Functionality and Performance
To demonstrate the expressive power of Probabilistic types, Fig-
ure 6 gives example rules that are consistent with our definition of
a Probabilistic type. The first rule, PR1, specifies that any expres-
sion can be executed on a Probabilistic type as long as all inputs
and outputs have a Probabilistic type. The expression, f , can be
any SQL expression; e.g., compositions of arithmetics, string func-
tions, etc. There is no need to encrypt f and hide which expressions
are registered in the TM.
As shown in Section 3.3, all errors that might occur as a side-
effect of processing f must be encrypted, too. In PR1 (and all
other example rules throughout this section), we model errors as
special values of the domain of TR. When functions are composed
(e.g., the result of f is used as input to another function), then the
errors are propagated; that is, the result is again an encrypted er-
ror value. Alternatively, encrypted errors could also be modeled as
a separate result type, as done in the example of Section 3.3. In
this case, we would implement composition would by providing
encrypted errors as additional inputs. These two ways of imple-
menting compositions are equivalent. The first approach to model
errors as special values of the encrypted result domain is simpler
and that is why we use that approach throughout the remainder of
this paper.
Depending on the expression, f , in Rule PR1, the condition that
all inputs must be encrypted and have a Probabilistic type can be
relaxed. For instance, if the expression is A + B and A is a se-
cret and B is not a secret (and not encrypted), then evaluating that
expression is okay if the result is encrypted and has a Probabilis-
tic type. This observation is particularly important for databases in
which only few columns contain secrets.
Another interesting way to relax Rule PR1 and extend the ex-
pressive power is that depending on the expression, it may be okay
to return errors in plaintext. As an example, consider the following
expression with S a secret string that has a Probabilistic type:
substring(−1,−1, S)
This expression returns an error because the position and length in
the substring function must not be negative. However, the attacker
does not learn anything about S from this error. More formally, the
error is a function of the other inputs independent of the (secret)
string. So, the following rule would be okay for a Probabilistic
type, TS , with domain String, if TR is also a Probabilistic type
with domain String, and E is a plaintext type that returns the error
status. TR may have the same or a different encryption key as TS .
substring(Integer, Integer, TS)→ 〈TR, E〉
Such a rule helps to implement updates that would otherwise not
be possible. (Section 6 discusses updates and issues with errors in
more detail.) However, the following rule would not be okay, if TI
is a Probabilistic type because in this case plaintext errors might
give away secrets of values of type TI :
substring(TI , TI , TS)→ 〈TR, E〉
In general, if we wish to expose errors, we must make sure that the
output error does not depend on any input that has a Probabilistic
type.
The second and third rule of Figure 6, PR2 and PR3, are spe-
cial cases of PR1. They are not needed and we only list them here
for exposition. PR2 specifies that the TM may evaluate any predi-
cate, if all inputs are Probabilistic. Furthermore, PR2 specifies that
the result of the predicate is a probabilistically encrypted Boolean
value so that the attacker cannot learn anything from the result. An
instance of EncBool can take one of the following values: true,
false, unknown (according to SQL’s three-valued logic), and an (en-
crypted) error code, if the evaluation of the predicate failed (e.g.,
one of the inputs of the predicate contained an error value).
Like PR2, PR3 is a special case of PR1. PR3 is the identity func-
tion that simply re-encrypts its input that is encrypted with the key
of T1 using the key of TR. This identity function is needed, for
instance, to implement casts or rotate the key of a column in the
database because many organizations have a security policy that
specifies that encryption keys need to change every, say, one or two
months. PR3 is also applicable if T1 is a plaintext type; PR3 is
one of the special cases of PR1 in which the inputs need not be
encrypted. This way, PR3 makes it possible to encrypt a column
if a column that was previously believed to be non-confidential be-
comes confidential.
PR4 is different and critical to implement SQL queries on Prob-
abilistic data in an effective way. PR4 specifies the orderPair()
function that takes two records as input (the fields of these records
may be all encrypted, all plaintext, or some encrypted and some
not encrypted), a comparison function, and returns the two records
ordered according to the comparison function and fully probabilis-
tically encrypted so that no information is leaked from the result.
PR4 makes sure that we can sort any table, thereby using Bubble-
Sort or any other oblivious sort algorithm [15]. Quicksort cannot be
implemented for Probabilistic types because it requires a partition-
ing function which gives a plaintext result that specifies whether an
element is larger or smaller than another element and, thus, violates
the encrypted in / encrypted out principle.
PR4 is defined on records, rather than values of a domain, be-
cause the encrypted result must not give any indication of whether
the first or the second tuple is smaller; from this point on, the SQL
query processor must operate on records in which all fields are
Probabilistic to avoid any kind of inference attacks on the result
of an oblivious sort.
In the extended version of this paper [2], we formally prove that
an adversary does not learn any instance level information about
a value of a Probabilistic type. We prove this by setting up an
indistinguishability experiment where the adversary is not able to
distinguish between two values given an oracle access to the TM
and an access to encryption oracles of other types.
THEOREM 1. (informal) The adversary does not learn any in-
formation about a value of a Probabilistic type other than what she
learns from the schema and the (encrypted) database instance (e.g.,
via correlations with other columns in the same table).
There is more good news. It turns out that the rules of Figure 6
are sufficient to implement any SQL SELECT query. All database
operators can be carried out using sort-based algorithms (e.g., joins,
group-by, sub-queries) and expression evaluation. Doing so, each
tuple of the final query result is tagged with an EncBool value and
the client can filter out the result tuples by decrypting the tuples and
this Boolean value. To speed up, this filtering at the client, the final
query result can be sorted by the EncBool value in the following
way: First, all errors (if any), then all true tuples which are part
of the query result, and then all unknown and false values. This
way, the client can immediately detect whether an error occurred
and, if not, quickly extract the result tuples. Such oblivious query
processing has been studied extensively in the literature; e.g., [5]
for the most recent overview.
The bad news is that the performance of query processing on
Probabilistic types can be prohibitively poor. The size of a join
result is quadratic with the join inputs, independent of the selectiv-
ity of the join predicate. Similarly, the amount of data that needs
to be shipped from the server to the client for a simple query that
applies a filter to a table (e.g., a key-value lookup) is in the same
order as the table, independent of the selectivity of the filter pred-
icate. Grouping has the same problem. Finally, oblivious RAM
simulations [14] are the only way to make use of indexes on Proba-
bilistic types; unfortunately, oblivious RAM simulations have high
overheads (e.g., poor cache locality). In summary, Probabilistic
types are only the right choice for highly confidential data that are
rarely part of a filter predicate, join predicate, or group-by key, or
for which performance is not a major concern. To achieve better
performance, we need to sacrifice confidentiality. That is what the
Deterministic and Ordered types do.
5.2 Deterministic
The goal of Deterministic types is to allow the encrypted data-
base to make the most efficient use of indexes, hash-based algo-
rithms, and filters to limit the size of (intermediate) query results
in the same as with a traditional, unencrypted database. Unfor-
tunately, these features cannot be supported without leaking some
information. The good news is that the information leakage from
supporting these features has already been studied in the context
of systems like CryptDB and SQL Always Encrypted which make
use of deterministic encryption (e.g., AES in ECB mode). With the
use of trusted computing, we can define Deterministic types that
significantly extend the functionality that can be implemented with
deterministic encryption, thereby giving the same confidentiality
guarantees. In particular, we can expand the use of indexes to any
sargable predicate such as “A = B +C” if an index on A is avail-
able; this expansion is only possible with our specific schemes and
not possible in systems like CryptDB and Always Encrypted. This
section formally defines Deterministic types and shows how to use
indexes and hash-based algorithms to efficiently process queries on
Deterministic types.
5.2.1 Definition and Confidentiality
For any domain D, let equal(D ,D) → Boolean denote the
equality predicate over D. Also, let hash(D) → HashDom de-
note a cryptographic hash function that maps values of D to a
plaintext hash domain; e.g., for SHA-1, the hash domain is the do-
main of 160-bit values. Let f1 . . . fk be injective functions; that is,
x 6= y =⇒ fi(x) 6= fi(y) for all i = 1 . . . k.
Given a schema with types T and rules R, we say a type D is
Deterministic if:
1. All paths in G(T ,R) from D to Boolean are of the form:
D
f1(1,1)→ T1 f2(1,1)→ . . . fk(1,1)→ Tk equal(,)→ Boolean
where each fi is an injective function.
2. All paths in G(T ,R) from D to HashDom are of the form:
D
f1(1,1)→ T1 f2(1,1)→ . . . fk(1,1)→ Tk hash(1,1)→ HashDom
where each fi is an injective function.
3. For any Ti in (1) and (2) above, there exists a unique path in
G(T ,R) from D to Ti.
4. There does not exist any path from D to a plaintext domain
that is not Boolean or HashDom .
In the full version of this paper [2], we show that for any De-
terministic type as defined above, an adversary does not learn any
information other than equality over its instances.
THEOREM 2. (informal) Values of a Deterministic type have
the same information leakage as encrypting the values using de-
terministic encryption.
To implement a Deterministic type, we can use either probabilis-
tic (e.g., AES in CBC mode) or deterministic encryption (e.g., AES
in ECB mode); the choice does not impact confidentiality. For per-
formance reasons, we suggest to use deterministic encryption be-
cause that way we need less calls to the TM in order to implement
comparisons and hash values of Deterministic types.
5.2.2 Functionality and Performance
To demonstrate the expressive power of Deterministic types, Fig-
ure 7 lists some example rules that are consistent with the for-
mal definition of Deterministic types. Specifically, these rules are
used to implement indexes and hash-based algorithms such as hash
joins. Sort-based algorithms and any oblivious algorithms that can
be used for Probabilistic types can also be used for Deterministic
types.
Deterministic vs. Probabilistic Types (DR1-DR4). Rules
DR1 to DR4 of Figure 7 are almost the same as Rules PR1 to PR4
for Probabilistic types (Figure 6); that is why all oblivous algo-
rithms which are applicable to Probabilistic types are also applica-
ble to Deterministic types. Since Deterministic types support a su-
perset of rules as compared to Probabilistic types, it is also easy to
prove that Deterministic types are weaker than Probabilistic types
(Section 4.4). There is, however, one subtle point in Rules DR1,
DR2, and DR4: All the output types must be Probabilistic. That
is, the result type of the addition of two integers that are instances
DR1: f(T1, . . . , T, . . . , Tn)→ TP
DR2: Pred(T1, . . . , T, . . . Tn)→ EncBool
DR3: identity(T )→ TO
DR4: orderPair(R1, R2, compare)→ RP , RP
DR5: equal(T, T )→ Boolean
DR6: hash(T )→ HashDom
Figure 7: Rules consistent with Strict Deterministic Types
T is a Deterministic Type; TO an Other Deterministic Type
TP any Probabilistic Type; R1, R2 any Row Type; RP any Probabilistic Row Type
others are arbitrary types
of Deterministic types is Probabilistic. As a consequence, only the
rules of Figure 6 are applicable to the result of such expressions and
Rules DR5-DR6 of Figure 7 are not applicable. This trick prevents
the enumeration attack of Section 3.4 and uses the pattern to break
cycles discussed in Section 4.3.
Rule DR3 of Figure 7 is special. The output of DR3 may be
a Deterministic type. Just like PR3 of Probabilistic types, we need
Rule DR3 for two purposes: (a) casts (e.g., conversion from Integer
to Float) and (b) key rotation (i.e., re-encrypting a column with a
new key). Casts are frequent in practice and are not supported in
any encrypted database system that is based on PPE.
Strict vs. Relaxed Deterministic Types (DR5, DR6).
DR5 and DR6 model the properties of deterministic encryption.
So, with deterministic encryption to implement Deterministic types
these rules are not needed because these functions can just as well
be implemented in the UM in the same way as in any database sys-
tem that exploits PPE such as Always Encrypted or CryptDB. One
important observation is that neither equal nor hash produce er-
rors. A bit trickier are null values. These cannot be kept secret in a
Deterministic type because the comparison with a null value is the
Boolean value unknown in SQL’s three-value logic. If null values
need to be kept confidential, then Deterministic types are not the
right choice. This observation holds also for encrypted databases
that are based on PPE such as CryptDB or Always Encrypted [28].
Rules DR5 and DR6 of Figure 7 model deterministic encryp-
tion in a strict way. With trusted computing resources, we could
also implement a more general variant of these rules. This vari-
ant of DR5 and DR6 is shown in Figure 8. This variant allows
to compare values of two Deterministic types with the same do-
main, but different encryption keys. In particular, it allows hash
joins between two columns that are encrypted using different keys.
(For this reason, DR6’ uses the hash function of T1 to hash val-
ues of T2.) One application for this relaxed variant is a security
policy that rotates the encryption keys of primary key columns and
foreign key columns individually. During this rotation process the
relaxed policy would allow efficient primary key / foreign key joins
(e.g., using hash joins or index nested-loop joins) even at a moment
after the primary key column has been re-encrypted and before the
foreign key column has been re-encrypted. Such relaxed Determin-
istic types could also result, e.g., from rules identity(T1) → TO
and identity(T2) → To where T1, T2 and TO are Deterministic
types.
On the negative side, the relaxed rule set of Figure 8 might be
vulnerable to additional inference attacks by correlating (encrypted)
values of T1 and T2 which are not supposed to be correlated. [2]
contains a more detailed and formal definition of relaxed types and
discussion of the confidentiality guarantees of relaxed Determinis-
tic types.
5.2.3 Composing Expressions and Index Lookups (DR7’)
DR5’: equal(T1, T2)→ Boolean
DR6’: hash(T2)→ HashDom
DR7’: evalExpr(T1, . . . , T1, expression)→ Temp(T1)
Figure 8: Rules for Relaxed Deterministic Types
T1, T2 any relaxed Deterministic Types, T1.D = T2.D
If there is an index on column R.a, then the goal is to be able
to use this index for all sargeable predicates; i.e., predicates of the
form: R.a = expression.
If the expression is a constant or a parameter of the query, then
this constant or query parameter can be encrypted with the key of
R.a and we can use the index in a straight-forward way using any
Deterministic type (relaxed and strict). However, for more complex
expressions, this approach no longer works. The purpose of Rule
DR7’ of relaxed Deterministic types is to evaluate such expressions
and use the index.
As an example, let us consider the following query with a query
parameter, : x:
SELECT * FROM R, S WHERE R.a = S.a + :x;
This query cannot be executed in systems like CryptDB if R.a and
S.a are encrypted deterministically, even if R.a and S.a are en-
crypted using the same key. This query can be executed in a TM
independent of the types and keys of R.a and S.a (Probabilistic,
strict Deterministic, or relaxed Deterministic). However, we can
only use the index on R.a, if both R.a and S.a have relaxed De-
terministic types (possibly with different encryption keys) and the
rules of Figure 8 are available. DR7’ is used to evaluate the expres-
sion S.a+ : x by encrypting the query parameter (: x) using the
key of S.a. DR7’, thus, corresponds to DR1 which allows to com-
pute any kind of arithmetics on any kind of Deterministic type. The
important difference between DR7’ and DR1 is that DR1 mandates
that the result is Probabilistic whereas DR7’ specifies that the re-
sult of S.a+ : x is also an instance of a relaxed Deterministic type.
This way, Rules DR5’ and DR6’ become applicable to the result of
S.a+ : x and we can use the index on R.a to probe the matching
tuples.
In order to understand the details of this approach, we need to de-
scribe how to build and probe indexes on columns with relaxed De-
terministic types. Rather than building the index on the encrypted
values (i.e., ciphertext) as done by Always Encrypted, we build the
index on hashes; that is, before inserting a new key into the index,
we call the TM in order to determine the hash of that key, thereby
using Rule DR6 (or DR6’ which is a generalization of DR6 in this
particular case). To probe a key, k, during query processing, we
apply the following approach:
• Compute hash(k). If k is of type R.a, then use Rule DR6. If
k is of type Temp(R.a) use Rule R6’.
• Use the index to lookup hash(k).
• For all matches i with hash(i) = hash(k), check whether k =
i. If the type of k is R.a, then this test can be done directly
without using the TM. If the type of k is Temp(R.a), then call
the TM to do this comparison (Rule DR5’).
Why does this approach prevent the enumeration attack? The
key idea is to use a new, different encryption key to encrypt the re-
sult of an expression. This way, the cycle is broken which is needed
to enumerate all values of a domain in the enumeration attack.
5.3 Ordered
The last and lowest level of confidentiality that we would like to
discuss is Ordered. We model Ordered types using order-preserving
encryption (OPE) as a role model. Order-preserving encryption has
been studied extensively in the past [1, 9, 24, 26]. It is controver-
sial whether it is strong enough for practical applications. We only
cover it here for completeness and without taking a stand on its
practicality.
The goal of OPE is to provide efficient implementations of range
predicates and Top N queries; in particular, using ordered indexes
such as B-trees. Ordered types can be formalized by using the
compare(D,D) → {−1, 0, 1} instead of equal in the definition
of Deterministic; we defer the details to the full version of this pa-
per [2].
Within our framework, Ordered types can be implemented by
enabling the following additional rule in addition to all the rules
for Deterministic types (Figure 7):
compare(T1, T2)→ {−1, 0, 1}
By supporting this additional rule, it is obvious that Ordered types
are weaker than Deterministic types which are in turn weaker than
Probabilistic types (Section 4.4).
As an encryption technique, any OPE technique or determin-
istic encryption technique or even probabilistic technique can be
used. In terms of confidentiality and functionality, the choice of
the encryption technique does not matter, assuming that the crypto
is strong and cannot be broken. However, OPE achieves best per-
formance because it avoids calls to the TM, in the same way as
deterministic encryption achieves the best performance for Deter-
ministic types (Section 5.2).
5.4 Discussion
This section described three levels of confidentiality. All three
levels allow the implementation of any SQL SELECT statement
on encrypted data. These three levels, however, differ in terms of
confidentiality and performance. In terms of confidentiality, these
levels correspond to the levels of confidentiality supported in state-
of-the-art encrypted database systems using PPE; i.e., the lower
levels of confidentiality, Deterministic and Ordered, are vulnera-
ble to certain kinds of inference attacks [22] whereas Probabilistic
types are semantically secure. In terms of performance, a lower
level of confidentiality can improve performance in two ways: (a)
It allows the use of a wider range of algorithms and index struc-
tures; (b) (intermediate) result sizes are smaller.
Figure 9 shows which kind of algorithms can be applied to which
kind of data. Using a TM, scan-based and sort-based algorithms
(e.g., nested-loop joins, sort-merge joins) can be applied to any kind
of data. Hash-based algorithms (e.g., hybrid-hash joins), however,
can only be applied to Deterministic and Ordered types. Likewise,
only Deterministic and Ordered types can make use of indexes.
Figure 10 shows the size of encrypted results, depending on the
operation and the level of confidentiality. For instance, the size of
the encrypted result of a filter is of the same order as the size of the
base table (denoted as O(n) in Figure 10) as explained in Section
5.1. Obviously, this results in poor performance if further oper-
ations such as joins are applied to the result of the filter or large
result sets must be shipped to the client. However, queries that ap-
ply an aggregate (e.g., count) after the filter can be processed fairly
efficiently even on Probabilistic types.
Overall, these results confirm the importance of the confiden-
tiality à la carte approach that allows users to chose the right type
for each column depending on the workload and confidentiality re-
quirements. This is particularly important for enterprise workloads
Probabilistic Deterministic Ordered
Nested-loop Algorithms X X X
Sort-based Algorithms X X X
Hash-based Algorithms 7 X X
Equality Indexes 7 X X
Ordered Indexes 7 7 X
Figure 9: Confidentiality Levels and Permissible Algorithms
Probabilistic Deterministic Ordered
Aggregation O(1 ) O(1 ) O(1 )
Equi Joins O(max(n1 ,n2 )) O(r) O(r)
Theta Joins O(n1 ∗ n2 ) O(n1 ∗ n2 ) O(n1 ∗ n2 )
Filter (Equality) O(n) O(r) O(r)
Filter (Range) O(n) O(n) O(r)
Figure 10: Confidentiality Levels and Result Sizes
n, n1, n2 size of input tables; r size of result table
and benchmarks such as TPC-C; for instance, it is typically afford-
able from a performance perspective to use a Probabilistic type for
credit card numbers whereas it is good to use a Deterministic type
for order numbers because inference attacks are difficult for or-
der numbers as the attacker likely does not have much background
knowledge on order numbers. Confidentiality à la carte can also be
offered with systems that are based on PPE only such as CryptDB
and Always Encrypted. However, these systems severely limit the
kinds of functions that can be applied to encrypted data, whereas
all SQL SELECT statements are executable with trusted computing
resources, regardless of the level of confidentiality.
6. CONFIDENTIALITY VS. FUNCTIONAL-
ITY
The previous section showed that any SQL SELECT statement
can be executed on encrypted data and that the performance de-
pends on the level of confidentiality. In some sense, all that was
good news providing a nice security / performance tradeoff for SQL
SELECT statements on encrypted data. This section shows con-
tains some bad news concerning SQL UPDATE statements. It con-
tains three example corner cases that demonstrate that some SQL
updates can only be executed with lower levels of confidentiality
(limiting the functionality of Probabilistic types), that for some up-
dates with predicates a lower level of confidentiality does not help
to improve performance (limiting the effectiveness of weaker levels
of confidentiality), and that some updates cannot be implemented
with any of the three confidentiality levels presented in the pre-
vious section (limiting the functionality of any kind of encrypted
database).
6.1 Integrity Constraints
Integrity constraints can only be implemented on Deterministic
and Ordered types. This is because checking an integrity constraint
implicitly carries out a comparison with a plaintext result.
As an example, consider a database with order and customer in-
formation. name is the key of the Customer table and every or-
der refers to a customer (with a foreign key on name). Further-
more, let us assume that customer names are confidential so that
Order.customer and Customer.name have a Probabilistic type. If
there were a unique or primary key constraint on Customer.name,
then an attacker could infer whether an order refers to a specific
customer or two orders refer to the same customer by deleting and
inserting tuples into the Customer table. To find out whether two
orders, O1 and O2, refer to the same customer (and thus possibly
launch an inference attack on the Order table, the attack could issue
the following sequence of SQL statements.
• DELETE FROM Customer;
• INSERT INTO Customer(name) VALUES (O1.name);
• INSERT INTO Customer(name) VALUES (O2.name);
• ABORT; // rollback all updates, restore Customer table
If there is a unique constraint on Customer.name and the second
INSERT fails, then the attacker can infer thatO1.name ==O2.name
which makes Order.name a Deterministic type, rather than a Prob-
abilistic type as required by the database designer.
Due to this kind of information leakage, it is critical that an at-
tacker does not have the authority to change any meta-data of the
database. Only the owner of the database is allowed to create in-
tegrity constraints and change the schema of an encrypted database.
6.2 Updates
Consider the following SQL update statement that gives all em-
ployees of a certain salary class a 10 percent raise:
UPDATE Emp SET salary = 1.1 * salary WHERE
salary = 100;
If Emp.salary has a Probabilistic type, the right way to execute this
update statement is to register the following program at the TM
(using Rule PR1 of Figure 6):
raiseIf100(salary)→ salary
newsalary = decrypt(Ksalary, input);
if (newsalary) == 100) newsalary = 1.1
* newsalary;
return encrypt(Ksalary, newsalary);
This program is called for every employee and the salary of all em-
ployees will be updated, even if unchanged. Note that an IND-CPA
encryption technique for a Probabilistic type generates a different
ciphertext for the same plaintext so that an attacker does not know
which salaries were updated.
With a Deterministic type, one would expect that only the salaries
of employees with salary == 100 would be updated. That is, the
expectated plan would be to select all employees that match the
WHERE clause (using Rule DR5 of Figure 7) and then to update
those employees using Rule DR1 of Figure 7 to compute the new
salary. Unfortunately, however, this plan is not legal because Rule
DR1 cannot be used to compute the new salary. The reason is that
the results of Rule DR1 must have a Probabilistic type in order to
break the cycle as described in Section 4.3. In this example, how-
ever, we assumed that Emp.salary has a deterministic type.
So, unfortunately, a Deterministic Emp.salary type does not help
to improve the performance of this update statement. Even if Emp.salary
has a Deterministic type, this update needs to be processed in the
same way as if Emp.salary had a Probabilistic type. In fact, it is
even worse because we need to generate a new key to re-encrypt
the salary column (using Rule DR3) because of the inapplicability
of Rule DR1.
This example nicely demonstrates how subtle and tricky it is to
implement encrypted databases and why secure hardware does not
solve all problems.
6.3 Updates and Errors
Let us revisit the update statement from the previous subsection
that raised the salaries of employees. In fact, we made an impor-
tant assumption in the previous subsection: the expression “1.1 *
salary” does not return any errors. It turns out that if this assump-
tion does not hold, then this update statement is not implementable
using any level of confidentiality. The problem is that errors must
be encrypted in all levels of confidentiality to avoid the simple at-
tacks described in Section 3.3. While encrypting and, thus, hiding
errors is possible while processing SELECT statements (the error
can be caught in the driver at the client), errors cannot be hidden
while processing update statements (including deletes and inserts).
If an update occurs while processing an update, the whole update
statement must fail and this failure cannot be hidden from an at-
tacker.
This example shows that it is not possible to implement the whole
SQL standard on top of an encrypted database even for low levels
of confidentiality and even if we have perfectly secure trusted com-
puting technology.
7. RELATED WORK
There has been a great deal of prior work on encrypted databases.
Almost all existing systems take a particular point in the confiden-
tiality / functionality / performance design space. One prominent
example is CryptDB, which is based on property preserving en-
cryption [25]. Because of this, CryptDB is limited to the specific
confidentiality / functionality / performance characteristics of state-
of-the-art PPE techniques. As a result, the supported functionality
is severely limited in terms of Probabilistic and Deterministic types.
In the system suggested here, the use of server-side TMs opens up
new opportunities to implement SQL functionality on encrypted
data that cannot be implemented in CryptDB and to achieve better
performance at the same of better levels of confidentiality.
One particular innovation of CryptDB is the use of the onion
technique. In CryptDB, peeling off a layer of confidentiality re-
quires updating an entire column, potentially making the whole ta-
ble unavailable during this process. Adding a layer also requires
shipping all the data to and from the client for re-encryption. The
proposed program registration scheme of this paper (Section 2.4)
has the same advantages of CryptDB’s onion technique (dynami-
cally increasing and reducing the confidentiality level) without pay-
ing the high price: Using a server-side TM, we can add or remove
a layer of protection from a column by simply deactivating and ac-
tivating TM functionality (i.e., rules).
The closest related work is previous work on encrypted databases
that makes use of secure hardware; e.g., TrustedDB [7], Haven [8],
Cipherbase [3,4], and VC3 [27]. The result of this work are not di-
rectly applicable to TrustedDB and Haven because TrustedDB and
Haven have a different attacker model (Section 3.1). In TrustedDB
and Haven, attackers can be prevented from executing queries on
the TM by special authorization techniques. This property, how-
ever, comes at a cost: The whole database must be encrypted and
the whole database engine must be ported and run inside the TM
which results in vulnerabilities from bugs and potential performance
issues. It is an interesting and important avenue of future work to
formalize and study the confidentiality and corresponding trade-
offs of systems like TrustedDB and Haven once these systems have
matured and become available. To date, these systems are still re-
search prototypes and it is difficult to formalize their confidentality
properties as these properties are still unclear.
Our results are directly applicable to the Cipherbase and VC3
projects which have the same attacker model as CryptDB and all
other systems that make use of PPE. The main contributions of the
Cipherbase are novel optimization techniques to execute queries
and update transactions on encrypted databases with a server-side
TM. These techniques are directly applicable to our work, too, and
orthogonal to the results of this paper.
This work is based on a large body of work that has explored in-
ference attacks from PPE (e.g., [22]), inference attacks from access
patterns (e.g., [12]), oblivioius RAM (e.g., [14]), and oblivious al-
gorithms (e.g., [5]). Our main contribution is to extend that work
and come to a more general way to reason about information leaks
and cleanly characterize the confidentiality/functionality/performance
tradeoffs of state-of-the-art encrypted database systems with secure
hardware.
The holy grail of encrypted databases is fully homomorphic en-
cryption (FHE) [13]. With FHE, this work would indeed become
obsolete and trusted hardware would not be required. Unfortu-
nately, we are still a far cry away from practical FHE.
8. CONCLUSION
This paper lays the foundation for a “confidentiality á la carte”
encrypted database system that make use of server-side trusted com-
puting. It studied the fundamental limits of those systems and de-
fined three levels of confidentiality that were inspired by today’s
generation of property-preserving encryption techniques (PPE). We
showed that compared to PPE-based systems we can achieve the
same confidentiality, but with much higher functionality and po-
tentially better performance because we support more algorithmic
variants (e.g., sort-based algorithms for Probabilistic types). Nev-
ertheless, this work confirmed previous results that there cannot
be a perfect encrypted database system that provides semantically
security, an implementation of the full SQL standard, and good per-
formance. That is why “confidentiality á la carte” will continue to
be the right model for encrypted databases.
There are several avenues for future work. First, the same ba-
sic principles laid in this work apply to problems such as directory
services (e.g., LDAP, Microsoft Active Directory), collaboration
tools (e.g., Wikis, Sharepoint), and any other structured workload
where expression evaluation can be factored out. Database systems
are just one example of systems that store and process confidential
data. Second, there is still a great deal of research required to im-
plement more efficient trusted computing-based database systems:
(Distributed) query optimization needs to be revisited and the archi-
tecture of Figure 2 inspires research on new algorithms to carry out
joins, aggregation, and sorting efficiently between an untrusted and
trusted machine. At the moment, this work is still at the conceptual
level and we will publish the results of performance experiments in
a future paper.
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